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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 2008, in a separate criminal case, Neal Caplinger was convicted of one count
of second degree kidnapping. He received a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five
yea rs fixed.
In 2010, Mr. Caplinger initiated the present case by filing a petition for postconviction relief.

In his petition, Mr. Caplinger presented approximately twelve claims

for relief (the precise number depends on how the claims in his pro se petition are
characterized and grouped). Among the claims presented was the contention that the
use of a grand jury proceeding in his criminal case was unconstitutional.

Ultimately

though, the district court summarily dismissed this claim on the basis that Mr. Caplinger
failed to cite any legal authority in support of his claim.
On appeal, Mr. Caplinger contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
"grand jury" claim on the basis that it did, and he requests that this claim be remanded
to the district court for further proceedings.
In response,

the State distorts the district court's

basis for dismissing

Mr. Caplinger's "grand jury" claim and, having so mischaracterized the basis for
dismissal, then goes on to distort Mr. Caplinger's claim on appeal, falsely characterizing
it as a challenge to the adequacy of the district court's notice. (See Respondent's Brief,
pp.5-7.)
The present Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State's "straw man"
argument.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in
Mr. Caplinger's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Caplinger's "grand jury" claim on
the basis that Mr. Caplinger's pro se petition for post-conviction relief failed to cite legal
authority?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Caplinger's "Grand Jury" Claim
On The Basis That His Pro Se Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Failed To Cite Legal
Authority
As was discussed in Mr. Caplinger's Appellant's Brief (pp.3 & 6), the district court
summarily dismissed Mr. Caplinger's "grand jury" claim on the basis that Mr. Caplinger
failed to support his claim with argument or authority.

Specifically, the district court

rules as follows:
Without any argument or support, Caplinger simply claims that
Idaho's indictment process is unconstitutional. He does not cite any case
law at all. The Court need not consider an issue not "supported by
argument and authority .... " Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229
P.3d 1146, 1152 (201 O); Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528,
181 P.3d 450,454 (2008); Huffv. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498,501, 148 P.3d
1244, 1247 (2006).
(R., p.59.)
Mr. Caplinger contends that this is not a proper basis for dismissal of a postconviction claim.

As was explained in Mr. Caplinger's Appellant's Brief (pp.6-7), the

authorities relied upon by the district court are wholly inapplicable because they relate to
the obligation of a party to an appeal to provide argument and authority in support of his
claim on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35, and because, in fact, the UPCPA
specifically provides that in submitting an application for post-conviction relief,
"[a]rgument, citations, and discussions of authorities are unnecessary." I.C. § 19-4903.
In response, the State attempts to mischaracterize both the district court's order
and Mr. Caplinger's claim on appeal. The State begins by mischaracterizing the district
court's basis for dismissing Mr. Caplinger's "grand jury" claim. The State claims that, in
stating that Mr. Caplinger's "grand jury" claim was subject to dismissal for his failure to
meet his obligation (under Idaho Appellate Rule 35) to provide argument and authority
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in support of his claim, what the district court was really saying was that his claim was
subject to dismissal because Mr. Caplinger failed "to allege facts that would entitle him
to relief" and relied exclusively on legal conclusions which need not have been accepted
as true. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Having so distorted the district court's dismissal
order, the State relies on the fact that, elsewhere in its dismissal order, the district court
had observed that under existing law it was '"not required to accept mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or accept petitioner's conclusions of
law' (R., p.57), and that it was Caplinger's burden to 'allege facts which, if true, would
entitle [him] to relief' (R., p.58)" (Respondent's Brief, p.5 (quoting other portions of
district court's order)), and mischaracterizes Mr. Caplinger's claim on appeal as a
challenge to the adequacy or specificity of the district court's notice.

(Respondent's

Brief, pp.5, 6.) Finally, having distorted both the basis for the district court's dismissal
order, as well as the claim presented on appeal, the State claims that this claim is
procedurally defaulted because the adequacy of the notice was not challenged below
(Respondent's Brief, p.6 (citing DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602 (2009)) and,
besides, it was properly dismissed on the grounds supposedly employed by the district
court (Respondent's Brief, p. 7).
The State's characterization of the district court's basis for dismissal of the "grand
jury" claim is intellectually dishonest. The district court's basis for dismissal of that claim
is clear on the face of the conditional dismissal order, and is in no way susceptible to
the interpretation now ascribed to it by the State. That basis, set forth in its own section
the district court's conditional dismissal order bearing the heading "II. Caplinger's
Indictment Claims Are Without Merit," was as follows:
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Without any argument or support, Caplinger simply claims that
Idaho's indictment process is unconstitutional. He does not cite any case
law at all. The Court need not consider an issue not "supported by
argument and authority .... " Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229
P.3d 1146, 1152 (201 O); Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528,
181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008); Huff v. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 501, 148 P.3d
1244, 1247 (2006).
(R., p.59.) As discussed above, this was a clear reference to I.A.R. 35's standard for

briefs on appeal. For the State to now suggest that this was an inartful attempt by the
district court to identify and apply UPCPA-appropriate standards is simply meritless. If
this was the district court's intent, then this is what the district court would have done.
(See R., p.57 (identifying UPCPA-appropriate standards, and citing UPCPA-appropriate
authority elsewhere in the conditional dismissal order).) This Court should not indulge
the State's request to re-write the district court's basis for dismissal of Mr. Caplinger's
"grand jury" claim to turn it into what the State feels the basis for dismissal should have
been.
Further, as noted, the State characterizes Mr. Caplinger's argument on appeal as
a complaint about the adequacy or specificity of the district court's notice. Again, the
State is being dishonest. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Caplinger clearly challenged the
basis for dismissal; he most certainly did not challenge the adequacy or specificity of the
notice provided by the district court.
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1

(See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, p.1 ("On appeal, Mr. Caplinger contends that the district
court erred in dismissing his 'grand jury' claim on the basis that it did .... "), p.3 ("On
appeal, Mr. Caplinger contends that the district court erred in dismissing his 'grand jury'
claim on the basis that it did."), p.4 (characterizing the issue on appeal as follows: "Did
the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Caplinger's 'grand jury' claim on the
basis that Mr. Caplinger's pro se petition for post-conviction relief failed to cite legal
authority?"), p.5 (summarizing the argument on appeal as follows: "The district court
erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Caplinger's 'grand jury' claim on the basis that his pro
se petition for post-conviction relief failed to cite legal authority"), p.6 ("In this case, the
only basis for dismissal for which Mr. Caplinger was given prior notice was actually no
6

Because the State's arguments on appeal rely on gross mischaracterizations of
the district court's reason for summarily dismissing Mr. Caplinger's "grand jury" claim
and Mr. Caplinger's argument on appeal, they should be rejected. This court should
look to the district court's actual basis for dismissal of the "grand jury" claim, recognize
that such a basis is not, in fact, an appropriate basis for dismissal, and remand the
"grand jury" claim to the district court for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Caplinger
requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for postconviction relief be vacated, and that his case be remanded to the district court for
further proceedings on his "grand jury" claim.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2012.

ERl~)t LEHTINEl':f
Chief, Appellate Unit

basis for dismissal at all."), p.7 ("Whatever problems may exist with Mr. Caplinger's
'grand jury' claim, his failure to cite legal authority in his pro se petition was not one of
them. Therefore, it was error for the district court to have summarily dismissed that
claim on that basis.").)
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